draft-ietf-sidrops-ov-egress-01.txt   draft-ietf-sidrops-ov-egress-02.txt 
Network Working Group R. Bush Network Working Group R. Bush
Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan & Arrcus Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan & Arrcus
Updates: 6811 (if approved) R. Volk Updates: 6811 (if approved) R. Volk
Intended status: Standards Track Deutsche Telekom Intended status: Standards Track Deutsche Telekom
Expires: September 5, 2020 J. Heitz Expires: September 20, 2020 J. Heitz
Cisco Cisco
March 4, 2020 March 19, 2020
BGP RPKI-Based Origin Validation on Export BGP RPKI-Based Origin Validation on Export
draft-ietf-sidrops-ov-egress-01 draft-ietf-sidrops-ov-egress-02
Abstract Abstract
A BGP speaker may perform RPKI origin validation not only on routes A BGP speaker may perform RPKI origin validation not only on routes
received from BGP neighbors and routes that are redistributed from received from BGP neighbors and routes that are redistributed from
other routing protocols, but also on routes it sends to BGP other routing protocols, but also on routes it sends to BGP
neighbors. For egress policy, it is important that the neighbors. For egress policy, it is important that the
classification uses the effective origin AS of the processed route, classification uses the effective origin AS of the processed route,
which may specifically be altered by the commonly available knobs which may specifically be altered by the commonly available knobs
such as removing private ASs, confederation handling, and other such as removing private ASs, confederation handling, and other
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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This Internet-Draft will expire on September 5, 2020. This Internet-Draft will expire on September 20, 2020.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Egress Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. Egress Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Operational Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4. Operational Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 7. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
This document does not change the protocol or semantics of [RFC6811] This document does not change the protocol or semantics of [RFC6811]
of RPKI-based origin validation. It highlights an important use case of RPKI-based origin validation. It highlights an important use case
of origin validation in eBGP egress policies, explaining specifics of of origin validation in eBGP egress policies, explaining specifics of
correct implementation in this context. correct implementation in this context.
As the origin AS may be modified by outbound policy, policy semantics As the origin AS of a BGP UPDATE is decided by configuration and
based on RPKI Origin Validation state MUST be able to be applied outbound policy of the BGP speaker, a validating BGP speaker MUST
separately on distribution into BGP and on egress. apply Route Origin Validation policy semantics against the origin
Autonomous System number which will actually be put in the AS_PATH
(see [RFC4271] 4.3 Path Attributes:b) of the UPDATE to the peer.
When applied to egress policy, the effective origin AS MUST be used This effective origin AS of the announcement might be affected by
to determine the Origin Validation state. The effective origin AS is removal of private AS(s), confederation, AS migration, etc. Any
that which will actually be the origin AS in the announcement. It AS_PATH modifications resulting in origin AS change MUST be taken
might be affected by removal of private AS(s), confederation, AS into account.
migration, etc. If there are any AS_PATH modifications resulting in
origin AS change, then these MUST be taken into account.
This document updates [RFC6811] by clarifying that implementations This document updates [RFC6811] by clarifying that implementations
must use the effective origin AS to determine the Origin Validation must use the effective origin AS to determine the Origin Validation
state when applying egress policy. state when applying egress policy.
2. Suggested Reading 2. Suggested Reading
It is assumed that the reader understands BGP, [RFC4271], the RPKI, It is assumed that the reader understands BGP, [RFC4271], the RPKI,
[RFC6480], Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs), [RFC6482], RPKI-based [RFC6480], Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs), [RFC6482], RPKI-based
Prefix Validation, [RFC6811], and Origin Validation Clarifications, Prefix Validation, [RFC6811], and Origin Validation Clarifications,
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5. Security Considerations 5. Security Considerations
This document does not create security considerations beyond those of This document does not create security considerations beyond those of
[RFC6811] and [RFC8481]. [RFC6811] and [RFC8481].
6. IANA Considerations 6. IANA Considerations
This document has no IANA Considerations. This document has no IANA Considerations.
7. References 7. Acknowledgments
7.1. Normative References Thanks to reviewers and comments from Linda Dunbar, Nick Hilliard,
Chris Morrow, Keyur Patel, Job Snijders, and Robert Sparks.
8. References
8.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A
Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4271>.
[RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route [RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route
Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482, Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6482, February 2012, DOI 10.17487/RFC6482, February 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6482>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6482>.
[RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R. [RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.
Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811, Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013, DOI 10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6811>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6811>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>. May 2017, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8481] Bush, R., "Clarifications to BGP Origin Validation Based [RFC8481] Bush, R., "Clarifications to BGP Origin Validation Based
on Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", RFC 8481, on Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", RFC 8481,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8481, September 2018, DOI 10.17487/RFC8481, September 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8481>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8481>.
7.2. Informative References 8.2. Informative References
[RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A
Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4271>.
[RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support [RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480, Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480,
February 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6480>. February 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6480>.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Randy Bush Randy Bush
Internet Initiative Japan & Arrcus Internet Initiative Japan & Arrcus
5147 Crystal Springs 5147 Crystal Springs
Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110 Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110
US US
Email: randy@psg.com Email: randy@psg.com
Ruediger Volk Ruediger Volk
Deutsche Telekom Deutsche Telekom
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