draft-ietf-sidrops-ov-egress-00.txt   draft-ietf-sidrops-ov-egress-01.txt 
Network Working Group R. Bush Network Working Group R. Bush
Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan & Arrcus Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan & Arrcus
Updates: 6811 (if approved) R. Volk Updates: 6811 (if approved) R. Volk
Intended status: Standards Track Deutsche Telekom Intended status: Standards Track Deutsche Telekom
Expires: May 2, 2020 J. Heitz Expires: September 5, 2020 J. Heitz
Cisco Cisco
October 30, 2019 March 4, 2020
BGP RPKI-Based Origin Validation on Export BGP RPKI-Based Origin Validation on Export
draft-ietf-sidrops-ov-egress-00 draft-ietf-sidrops-ov-egress-01
Abstract Abstract
A BGP speaker may perform RPKI origin validation not only on routes A BGP speaker may perform RPKI origin validation not only on routes
received from BGP neighbors and routes that are redistributed from received from BGP neighbors and routes that are redistributed from
other routing protocols, but also on routes it sends to BGP other routing protocols, but also on routes it sends to BGP
neighbors. For egress policy, it is important that the neighbors. For egress policy, it is important that the
classification uses the effective origin AS of the processed route, classification uses the effective origin AS of the processed route,
which may specifically be altered by the commonly available knobs which may specifically be altered by the commonly available knobs
such as removing private ASs, confederation handling, and other such as removing private ASs, confederation handling, and other
modifications of the origin AS. modifications of the origin AS.
Requirements Language Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" are to "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
be interpreted as described in [RFC2119] only when they appear in all "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
upper case. They may also appear in lower or mixed case as English 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
words, without normative meaning. capitals, as shown here.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on May 2, 2020. This Internet-Draft will expire on September 5, 2020.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Egress Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Operational Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
This document does not change the protocol or semantics of [RFC6811] This document does not change the protocol or semantics of [RFC6811]
of RPKI-based origin validation. It highlights an important use case of RPKI-based origin validation. It highlights an important use case
of origin validation in eBGP egress policies, explaining specifics of of origin validation in eBGP egress policies, explaining specifics of
correct implementation in this context. correct implementation in this context.
As the origin AS may be modified by outbound policy, policy semantics As the origin AS may be modified by outbound policy, policy semantics
based on RPKI Origin Validation state MUST be able to be applied based on RPKI Origin Validation state MUST be able to be applied
separately on distribution into BGP and on egress. separately on distribution into BGP and on egress.
When applied to egress policy, the effective origin AS MUST be used When applied to egress policy, the effective origin AS MUST be used
to determine the Origin Validation state. The effective origin AS is to determine the Origin Validation state. The effective origin AS is
that which will actually be the origin AS in the announcement. It that which will actually be the origin AS in the announcement. It
might be affected by removal of private AS(s), confederation, AS might be affected by removal of private AS(s), confederation, AS
migration, etc. If there are any AS_PATH modifications resulting in migration, etc. If there are any AS_PATH modifications resulting in
origin AS change, then these MUST be taken into account. origin AS change, then these MUST be taken into account.
This document updates [RFC6811] by clarifying that implementations
must use the effective origin AS to determine the Origin Validation
state when applying egress policy.
2. Suggested Reading 2. Suggested Reading
It is assumed that the reader understands BGP, [RFC4271], the RPKI, It is assumed that the reader understands BGP, [RFC4271], the RPKI,
[RFC6480], Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs), [RFC6482], RPKI-based [RFC6480], Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs), [RFC6482], RPKI-based
Prefix Validation, [RFC6811], and Origin Validation Clarifications, Prefix Validation, [RFC6811], and Origin Validation Clarifications,
[RFC8481]. [RFC8481].
3. Egress Processing 3. Egress Processing
BGP implementations supporting RPKI-based origin validation SHOULD BGP implementations supporting RPKI-based origin validation SHOULD
skipping to change at page 4, line 5 skipping to change at page 4, line 28
[RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route [RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route
Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482, Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6482, February 2012, DOI 10.17487/RFC6482, February 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6482>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6482>.
[RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R. [RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.
Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811, Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013, DOI 10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6811>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6811>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8481] Bush, R., "Clarifications to BGP Origin Validation Based [RFC8481] Bush, R., "Clarifications to BGP Origin Validation Based
on Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", RFC 8481, on Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", RFC 8481,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8481, September 2018, DOI 10.17487/RFC8481, September 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8481>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8481>.
7.2. Informative References 7.2. Informative References
[RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A [RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A
Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006, DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006,
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