draft-ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy-09.txt		draft-ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy-10.txt
	Network Working Group A. Azimov		Network Working Group A. Azimov
	Internet-Draft E. Bogomazov		Internet-Draft E. Bogomazov
	Intended status: Standards Track Qrator Labs		Intended status: Standards Track Qrator Labs
	Expires: October 21, 2020 R. Bush		Expires: November 16, 2020 R. Bush
	Internet Initiative Japan & Arrcus		Internet Initiative Japan & Arrcus, Inc.
	K. Patel		K. Patel
	Arrcus, Inc.		Arrcus
	K. Sriram		K. Sriram
	US NIST		USA NIST
	April 19, 2020		May 15, 2020
	Route Leak Prevention using Roles in Update and Open messages		Route Leak Prevention using Roles in Update and Open messages
	draft-ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy-09		draft-ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy-10
	Abstract		Abstract
	Route leaks are the propagation of BGP prefixes which violate		Route leaks are the propagation of BGP prefixes which violate
	assumptions of BGP topology relationships; e.g. passing a route		assumptions of BGP topology relationships; e.g. passing a route
	learned from one peer to another peer or to a transit provider,		learned from one peer to another peer or to a transit provider,
	passing a route learned from one transit provider to another transit		passing a route learned from one transit provider to another transit
	provider or to a peer. Today, approaches to leak prevention rely on		provider or to a peer. Today, approaches to leak prevention rely on
	marking routes by operator configuration, with no check that the		marking routes by operator configuration, with no check that the
	configuration corresponds to that of the BGP neighbor, or enforcement		configuration corresponds to that of the BGP neighbor, or enforcement
	skipping to change at page 2, line 12 ¶		skipping to change at page 2, line 12 ¶
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute		Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-		working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.		Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	This Internet-Draft will expire on October 21, 2020.		This Internet-Draft will expire on November 16, 2020.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
	(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of		(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
	publication of this document. Please review these documents		publication of this document. Please review these documents
	skipping to change at page 2, line 42 ¶		skipping to change at page 2, line 42 ¶
	2. Peering Relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		2. Peering Relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	3. BGP Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		3. BGP Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	4. BGP Role Capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		4. BGP Role Capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	5. Role correctness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		5. Role correctness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	5.1. Strict mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		5.1. Strict mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	6. BGP Only to Customer (OTC) Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		6. BGP Only to Customer (OTC) Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	7. Enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		7. Enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	8. Additional Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		8. Additional Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	11. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
			Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
	Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10		Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	A BGP route leak occurs when a route is learned from a transit		A BGP route leak occurs when a route is learned from a transit
	provider or peer and then announced to another provider or peer. See		provider or peer and then announced to another provider or peer. See
	[RFC7908]. These are usually the result of misconfigured or absent		[RFC7908]. These are usually the result of misconfigured or absent
	BGP route filtering or lack of coordination between two BGP speakers.		BGP route filtering or lack of coordination between two BGP speakers.
	The mechanism proposed in		The mechanism proposed in
	skipping to change at page 8, line 34 ¶		skipping to change at page 8, line 34 ¶
	10. Security Considerations		10. Security Considerations
	This document proposes a mechanism for prevention of route leaks that		This document proposes a mechanism for prevention of route leaks that
	are the result of BGP policy misconfiguration.		are the result of BGP policy misconfiguration.
	A misconfiguration in OTC setup may affect prefix propagation. But		A misconfiguration in OTC setup may affect prefix propagation. But
	the automation that is provided by BGP roles should make such		the automation that is provided by BGP roles should make such
	misconfiguration unlikely.		misconfiguration unlikely.
	11. Acknowledgments		11. References
	The authors wish to thank Douglas Montgomery, Brian Dickson, Andrei
	Robachevsky, and Daniel Ginsburg for their contributions to a variant
	of this work.
	12. References
	12.1. Normative References		11.1. Normative References
	[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate		[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
	Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,		Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,		DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
	[RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A		[RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A
	Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271,		Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006,		DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4271>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4271>.
	skipping to change at page 9, line 22 ¶		skipping to change at page 9, line 13 ¶
	April 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4486>.		April 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4486>.
	[RFC5492] Scudder, J. and R. Chandra, "Capabilities Advertisement		[RFC5492] Scudder, J. and R. Chandra, "Capabilities Advertisement
	with BGP-4", RFC 5492, DOI 10.17487/RFC5492, February		with BGP-4", RFC 5492, DOI 10.17487/RFC5492, February
	2009, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5492>.		2009, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5492>.
	[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC		[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
	2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,		2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
	May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.		May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
	12.2. Informative References		11.2. Informative References
	[Gao] Gao, L. and J. Rexford, "Stable Internet routing without		[Gao] Gao, L. and J. Rexford, "Stable Internet routing without
	global coordination", IEEE/ACM Transactions on		global coordination", IEEE/ACM Transactions on
	Networking, Volume 9, Issue 6, pp 689-692, DOI		Networking, Volume 9, Issue 6, pp 689-692, DOI
	10.1109/90.974523, December 2001,		10.1109/90.974523, December 2001,
	<https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/974523>.		<https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/974523>.
	[I-D.ietf-grow-route-leak-detection-mitigation]		[I-D.ietf-grow-route-leak-detection-mitigation]
	Sriram, K. and A. Azimov, "Methods for Detection and		Sriram, K. and A. Azimov, "Methods for Detection and
	Mitigation of BGP Route Leaks", draft-ietf-grow-route-		Mitigation of BGP Route Leaks", draft-ietf-grow-route-
	skipping to change at page 10, line 12 ¶		skipping to change at page 10, line 5 ¶
	RFC 8212, DOI 10.17487/RFC8212, July 2017,		RFC 8212, DOI 10.17487/RFC8212, July 2017,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8212>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8212>.
	[Streibelt]		[Streibelt]
	Streibelt, F., Lichtblau, F., Beverly, R., Feldmann, A.,		Streibelt, F., Lichtblau, F., Beverly, R., Feldmann, A.,
	Cristel, C., Smaragdakis, G., and R. Bush, "BGP		Cristel, C., Smaragdakis, G., and R. Bush, "BGP
	Communities: Even more Worms in the Routing Can",		Communities: Even more Worms in the Routing Can",
	<https://people.mpi-inf.mpg.de/~fstreibelt/preprint/		<https://people.mpi-inf.mpg.de/~fstreibelt/preprint/
	communities-imc2018.pdf>.		communities-imc2018.pdf>.
			Acknowledgements
			The authors wish to thank Andrei Robachevsky, Daniel Ginsburg, Jeff
			Haas, Ruediger Volk, Sue Hares, and John Scudder for comments,
			suggestions, and critique.
			Contributors
			Brian Dickson
			Independent
			Email: brian.peter.dickson@gmail.com
			Doug Montgomery
			USA National Institute of Standards and Technology
			Email: dougm@nist.gov
	Authors' Addresses		Authors' Addresses
	Alexander Azimov		Alexander Azimov
	Qrator Labs		Qrator Labs
			1-y Magistralnyy tupik 5A
			Moscow 123290
			Russian Federation
	Email: a.e.azimov@gmail.com		Email: a.e.azimov@gmail.com
	Eugene Bogomazov		Eugene Bogomazov
	Qrator Labs		Qrator Labs
			1-y Magistralnyy tupik 5A
			Moscow 123290
			Russian Federation
	Email: eb@qrator.net		Email: eb@qrator.net
	Randy Bush		Randy Bush
	Internet Initiative Japan & Arrcus		Internet Initiative Japan & Arrcus, Inc.
			5147 Crystal Springs
			Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110
			United States of America
	Email: randy@psg.com		Email: randy@psg.com
	Keyur Patel		Keyur Patel
	Arrcus, Inc.		Arrcus
			2077 Gateway Place, Suite #400
			San Jose, CA 95119
			US
	Email: keyur@arrcus.com		Email: keyur@arrcus.com
	Kotikalapudi Sriram		Kotikalapudi Sriram
	US NIST		USA National Institute of Standards and Technology
			100 Bureau Drive
			Gaithersburg, MD 20899
			United States of America
	Email: ksriram@nist.gov		Email: ksriram@nist.gov
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