draft-ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy-06.txt   draft-ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy-07.txt 
Network Working Group A. Azimov Network Working Group A. Azimov
Internet-Draft E. Bogomazov Internet-Draft E. Bogomazov
Intended status: Standards Track Qrator Labs Intended status: Standards Track Qrator Labs
Expires: January 9, 2020 R. Bush Expires: July 12, 2020 R. Bush
Internet Initiative Japan & Arrcus Internet Initiative Japan & Arrcus
K. Patel K. Patel
Arrcus, Inc. Arrcus, Inc.
K. Sriram K. Sriram
US NIST US NIST
July 8, 2019 January 9, 2020
Route Leak Prevention using Roles in Update and Open messages Route Leak Prevention using Roles in Update and Open messages
draft-ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy-06 draft-ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy-07
Abstract Abstract
Route Leaks are the propagation of BGP prefixes which violate Route leaks are the propagation of BGP prefixes which violate
assumptions of BGP topology relationships; e.g. passing a route assumptions of BGP topology relationships; e.g. passing a route
learned from one peer to another peer or to a transit provider, learned from one peer to another peer or to a transit provider,
passing a route learned from one transit provider to another transit passing a route learned from one transit provider to another transit
provider or to a peer. Today, approaches to leak prevention rely on provider or to a peer. Today, approaches to leak prevention rely on
marking routes by operator configuration, with no check that the marking routes by operator configuration, with no check that the
configuration corresponds to that of the BGP neighbor, or enforcement configuration corresponds to that of the BGP neighbor, or enforcement
that the two BGP speakers agree on the relationship. This document that the two BGP speakers agree on the relationship. This document
enhances BGP OPEN to establish agreement of the (peer, customer, enhances BGP OPEN to establish agreement of the (peer, customer,
provider, Route Server, Route Server client) relationship of two provider, Route Server, Route Server client) relationship of two
neighboring BGP speakers to enforce appropriate configuration on both neighboring BGP speakers to enforce appropriate configuration on both
skipping to change at page 2, line 12 skipping to change at page 2, line 12
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This Internet-Draft will expire on January 9, 2020. This Internet-Draft will expire on July 12, 2020.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
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described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Peering Relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Peering Relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. BGP Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. BGP Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Role capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4. BGP Role Capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. Role correctness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5. Role correctness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5.1. Strict mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5.1. Strict mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6. BGP Only To Customer attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 6. BGP Only to Customer (OTC) Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7. Enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 7. Enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
8. Additional Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 8. Additional Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
11. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 11. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
BGP route leaks are BGP route(s) which were learned from transit BGP route leak occurs when a route is learned from a transit provider
provider or peer and then announced to another provider or peer. See or peer and then announced to another provider or peer. See
[RFC7908]. These are usually the result of misconfigured or absent [RFC7908]. These are usually the result of misconfigured or absent
BGP route filtering or lack of coordination between two BGP speakers. BGP route filtering or lack of coordination between two BGP speakers.
The mechanism proposed in The mechanism proposed in
[I-D.ietf-idr-route-leak-detection-mitigation] uses large-communities [I-D.ietf-grow-route-leak-detection-mitigation] uses large-
to attempt detection of route leaks. While signaling using communities to perform detection and mitigation of route leaks.
communities is easy to implement, ut relies on operator maintained While signaling using communities is easy to implement and deploy
policy configuration which is too easily, and too often, quickly, it normally relies on operator-maintained policy
misconfigured. Another problem may occur if the community signal is configuration, which is often vulnerable to misconfiguration. There
stripped, accidentally or maliciously. is also the vulnerability that the community signal may be stripped,
accidentally or maliciously.
This document provides configuration automation using 'BGP roles', This document provides configuration automation using 'BGP roles',
which are negotiated using a new BGP Capability Code in OPEN message, which are negotiated using a new BGP Capability Code in OPEN message
[RFC5492] Sec 4. Either or both BGP speakers MAY be configured to (see Section 4 in [RFC5492]). Either or both BGP speakers MAY be
require that this capability be agreed for the BGP OPEN to succeed. configured to require that this capability be agreed for the BGP OPEN
to succeed.
A new BGP Path Attribute is specified that SHOULD be automatically A new BGP Path Attribute is specified that SHOULD be automatically
configured using BGP roles. This attribute prevents networks from configured using BGP roles. This attribute prevents networks from
creating leaks, and detects leaks created by third-parties. creating leaks, and detects leaks created by third parties.
2. Peering Relationships 2. Peering Relationships
Despite uses of words such as "Customer," "Peer." etc.; these are not Despite the use of terms such as "customer", "peer", etc. in this
business relationships, who pays whom, etc. These are common terms document, these are not necessarily business relationships based on
to represent restrictions on BGP route propagation, sometimes known payment agreements. These terms are used to represent restrictions
as the Gao-Rexford model [cite]. on BGP route propagation, sometimes known as the Gao-Rexford model
[Gao]. The following is a list of various roles in BGP peering and
the corresponding rules for route propagation:
A Provider: MAY send to a customer all available prefixes. Provider: MAY send to a customer all available prefixes.
A Customer: MAY send to a provider their own prefixes and prefixes Customer: MAY send to a provider their own prefixes and prefixes
learned from any of their customers. A customer MUST NOT send to learned from any of their customers. A customer MUST NOT send to
a provider prefixes learned from its peers, from other providers, a provider prefixes learned from its peers, from other providers,
or from Route Servers. or from Route Servers.
A Route Server (RS) MAY send to a RS Client all available prefixes. Route Server (RS): MAY send to an RS Client all available prefixes.
A Route Server Client (RS-client) MAY send to an RS its own prefixes Route Server Client (RS-client): MAY send to an RS its own prefixes
and prefixes learned from its customers. A RS-client MUST NOT and prefixes learned from its customers. An RS-client MUST NOT
send to an RS prefixes learned from peers, from its providers, or send to an RS prefixes learned from its peers or providers, or
from other RS(s). from another RS.
A Peer: MAY send to a peer its own prefixes and prefixes learned Peer: MAY send to a peer its own prefixes and prefixes learned from
from its customers. A peer MUST NOT send to a peer prefixes its customers. A peer MUST NOT send to a peer prefixes learned
learned from other peers, from its providers, or from RS(s). from other peers, from its providers, or from RS(s).
Of course, any BGP speaker may apply policy to reduce what is Of course, any BGP speaker may apply policy to reduce what is
announced, and a recipient may apply policy to reduce the set of announced, and a recipient may apply policy to reduce the set of
routes they accept. Violation of the above rules may result in route routes they accept. Violation of the above rules may result in route
leaks so MUST not be allowed. Automatic enforment of these rules leaks and MUST not be allowed. Automatic enforcement of these rules
should significantly reduce configuration mistakes. While these should significantly reduce route leaks that may otherwise occur due
enforcing the above rules will address most BGP peering scenarios, to manual configuration mistakes. While enforcing the above rules
their configuration isn't part of BGP itself; therefore requiring will address most BGP peering scenarios, their configuration is not
configuration of ingress and egress prefix filters is still strongly part of BGP itself; therefore, additionally requiring configuration
advised. of ingress and egress prefix filters is still strongly advised.
3. BGP Role 3. BGP Role
BGP Role is new configuration option that SHOULD be configured on BGP Role is new configuration option that SHOULD be configured on
each BGP session. It reflects the real-world agreement between two each BGP session. It reflects the real-world agreement between two
BGP speakers about their relationship. BGP speakers about their relationship.
Allowed Role values for eBGP sessions are: Allowed Role values for eBGP sessions are:
o Provider - sender is a transit provider to neighbor; o Provider - sender is a transit provider to neighbor;
o Customer - sender is transit customer of neighbor; o Customer - sender is a transit customer of neighbor;
o RS - sender is a Route Server, usually at internet exchange point o RS - sender is a Route Server, usually at an Internet exchange
(IX) point (IX);
o RS-Client - sender is client of RS o RS-Client - sender is client of an RS;
o Peer - sender and neighbor are peers; o Peer - sender and neighbor are peers.
Since BGP Role reflects the relationship between two BGP speakers, it Since BGP Role reflects the relationship between two BGP speakers, it
could also be used for more than route leak mitigation. could also be used for other purposes besides route leak mitigation.
4. Role capability 4. BGP Role Capability
The TLV (type, length, value) of the BGP Role capability are: The TLV (type, length, value) of the BGP Role capability are:
o Type - <TBD1>; o Type - <TBD1>;
o Length - 1 (octet); o Length - 1 (octet);
o Value - integer corresponding to speaker' BGP Role. o Value - integer corresponding to speaker's BGP Role.
+-------+---------------------+ +-------+---------------------+
| Value | Role name | | Value | Role name |
+-------+---------------------+ +-------+---------------------+
| 0 | Sender is Provider | | 0 | Sender is Provider |
| 1 | Sender is RS | | 1 | Sender is RS |
| 2 | Sender is RS-Client | | 2 | Sender is RS-Client |
| 3 | Sender is Customer | | 3 | Sender is Customer |
| 4 | Sender is Peer | | 4 | Sender is Peer |
+-------+---------------------+ +-------+---------------------+
Table 1: Predefined BGP Role Values Table 1: Predefined BGP Role Values
5. Role correctness 5. Role correctness
Section 3 described how BGP Role encodes the relationship between two Section 3 described how BGP Role encodes the relationship between two
BGP speakers. But the mere presence of BGP Role doesn't BGP speakers. But the mere presence of BGP Role doesn't
automatically guarantee role agreement between two BGP peers. automatically guarantee role agreement between two BGP peers.
To enforce correctness, the BGP Role check is used with a set of To enforce correctness, the BGP Role check is applied with a set of
constrains on how speakers' BGP Roles MUST correspond. Of course, constraints on how speakers' BGP Roles MUST correspond. Of course,
each speaker MUST announce and accept the BGP Role capability in the each speaker MUST announce and accept the BGP Role capability in the
BGP OPEN message exchange. BGP OPEN message exchange.
If a speaker receives a BGP Role capability, it MUST check the value If a speaker receives a BGP Role capability, it MUST check the value
of the received capability with its own BGP Role (if it is set). The of the received capability with its own BGP Role (if it is set). The
allowed pairings are (first a sender's Role, second the receiver's allowed pairings are (first a sender's Role, second the receiver's
Role): Role):
+-------------+---------------+ +-------------+---------------+
| Sender Role | Receiver Role | | Sender Role | Receiver Role |
+-------------+---------------+ +-------------+---------------+
| Provider | Customer | | Provider | Customer |
| Customer | Provider | | Customer | Provider |
| RS | RS-Client | | RS | RS-Client |
| RS-Client | RS | | RS-Client | RS |
| Peer | Peer | | Peer | Peer |
+-------------+---------------+ +-------------+---------------+
Table 2: Allowed Role Capabilities Table 2: Allowed Role Capabilities
If the Role pair is not in the above table, a speaker MUST send a If the observed Role pair is not in the above table, then the
Role Mismatch Notification (code 2, sub-code <TBD2>). receiving speaker MUST send a Role Mismatch Notification (code 2,
subcode <TBD2>).
5.1. Strict mode 5.1. Strict mode
A new BGP configuration option "strict mode" is defined with values A new BGP configuration option "strict mode" is defined with values
of true or false. If set to true, then the speaker MUST refuse to of true or false. If set to true, then the speaker MUST refuse to
establish a BGP session with a neighbor which does not announce the establish a BGP session with a neighbor which does not announce the
BGP Role capability in the OPEN message. If a speaker rejects a BGP Role capability in the OPEN message. If a speaker rejects a
connection, it MUST send a Connection Rejected Notification [RFC4486] connection, it MUST send a Connection Rejected Notification [RFC4486]
(Notification with error code 6, subcode 5). By default, strict mode (Notification with error code 6, subcode 5). By default, strict mode
SHOULD be set to false for backward compatibility with BGP speakers SHOULD be set to false for backward compatibility with BGP speakers
that do not yet support this mechanism. that do not yet support this mechanism.
6. BGP Only To Customer attribute 6. BGP Only to Customer (OTC) Attribute
The Only To Customer (OTC) BGP Attribute is a new optional, Newly defined here, the Only to Customer (OTC) is an optional,
transitive BGP Path attribute with the Type Code <TBD3>. transitive BGP Path attribute with the Type Code <TBD3>. The OTC
attribute is four bytes long and its value equals an AS number. The
semantics and usage of the OTC attribute are made clear by the
ingress and egress policies described below.
This four byte attribute MUST apply the following policy: The following ingress policy applies to the OTC attribute:
1. If a route with OTC attribute is received from Customer or RS- 1. If a route with OTC attribute is received from a Customer or RS-
client - it's a route leak and MUST be rejected. client, then it is a route leak and MUST be rejected.
2. If a route with OTC attribute is received from Peer and its value 2. If a route with OTC attribute is received from a Peer and its
isn't equal to the neighbor's ASN - it's a route leak and MUST be value is not equal to the neighbor's ASN, then it is a route leak
rejected. and MUST be rejected.
3. If a route is received from a Provider, Peer or RS and the OTC 3. If a route is received from a Provider, Peer or RS and the OTC
attribute has not been set it MUST be added with value equal to attribute is not present, then it MUST be added with value equal
AS number of the neighbor (sender). to the neighbor's AS number.
The egress policy MUST be: The egress policy MUST be:
1. A route with the OTC attribute set MUST NOT be sent to providers, 1. A route with the OTC attribute set MUST NOT be sent to providers,
peers, or RS(s). peers, or RS(s).
2. If route is sent to customer or peer and the OTC attribute is not 2. If route is sent to a customer or peer, or an RS clien and the
set it MUST be added with value equal to AS number of the sender. OTC attribute is not present, then it MUST be added with value
equal to AS number of the sender.
Once the OTC attribute has been set, it MUST be preserved unchanged. Once the OTC attribute has been set, it MUST be preserved unchanged.
7. Enforcement 7. Enforcement
Having the relationship unequivocally agreed between the two peers in Having the relationship unequivocally agreed between the two peers in
BGP OPEN is critical; the BGP implementations enforce the BGP OPEN is critical; BGP implementations MUST enforce the
relationship irrespective of operator policy configuration errors. relationship/role establishment rules (see Section 5) in order to
overcome operator policy configuration errors (if any).
Similarly, the application of that relationship on prefix propagation Similarly, the application of that relationship on prefix propagation
using OTC MUST BE enforced by the BGP implementations, and not using OTC MUST BE enforced by the BGP implementations, and not
exposed to user mis-configuration. exposed to user mis-configuration.
As opposed to communities, BGP attributes may not be generally As opposed to communities, BGP attributes may not be generally
modified or filtered by the operator. The router(s) enforce them. modified or filtered by the operator; BGP router implementations
This is the desired property for the OTC marking. Hence, this enforce such treatment. This is the desired property for the OTC
document specifies OTC as an attribute. marking. Hence, this document specifies OTC as an attribute.
8. Additional Considerations 8. Additional Considerations
There are peering relationships that are 'complex', i.e., both
parties are intentionally sending prefixes received from each other
to their non-transit peers and/or transit providers. If multiple BGP
peerings can segregate the 'complex' parts of the relationship, the
complex peering roles can be segregated into different normal BGP
sessions, and BGP Roles MUST be used on each of the resulting normal
(non-complex) BGP sessions.
No Roles SHOULD be configured on a 'complex' BGP session (assuming it
is not segregated) and in that case, OTC MUST be set by configuration
on a per-prefix basis. However, there can be no measures to check
correctness of OTC use if BGP Role is not configured.
As the BGP Role reflects the peering relationship between neighbors, As the BGP Role reflects the peering relationship between neighbors,
it might have other uses. For example, BGP Role might affect route it might have other uses beyond the route leaks solution discussed so
priority, or be used to distinguish borders of a network if a network far. For example, BGP Role might affect route priority, or be used
consists of multiple ASs. Though such uses may be worthwhile, they to distinguish borders of a network if a network consists of multiple
are not the goal of this document. Note that such uses would require ASs. Though such uses may be worthwhile, they are not the goal of
local policy control. this document. Note that such uses would require local policy
control.
As BGP role configuration results in automatic creation of inbound/ As BGP role configuration results in automatic creation of inbound/
outbound filters, existence of roles should be treated as existence outbound filters, existence of roles should be treated as existence
of Import and Export policy. [RFC8212] of Import and Export policy [RFC8212].
There are peering relationships which are 'complex'; e.g. when both
parties are intentionally sending prefixes received from each other
to their peers and/or upstreams. If multiple BGP peerings can
segregate the 'complex' parts of the relationship, the complex
peering roles can be segregated into different BGP sessions, and
normal BGP Roles MUST be used on the non-complex sessions. No Roles
SHOULD be configured on 'complex' BGP sessions, and OTC MUST be set
by configuration on a per-prefix basis. There can be no measures to
check correctness of OTC use if Role is not configured.
9. IANA Considerations 9. IANA Considerations
This document defines a new Capability Codes option [to be removed This document defines a new Capability Codes option [to be removed
upon publication: http://www.iana.org/assignments/capability-codes/ upon publication: http://www.iana.org/assignments/capability-codes/
capability-codes.xhtml] [RFC5492], named "BGP Role", assigned value capability-codes.xhtml] [RFC5492], named "BGP Role" with an assigned
<TBD1> . The length of this capability is 1. value <TBD1>. The length of this capability is 1.
The BGP Role capability includes a Value field, for which IANA is The BGP Role capability includes a Value field, for which IANA is
requested to create and maintain a new sub-registry called "BGP Role requested to create and maintain a new sub-registry called "BGP Role
Value". Assignments consist of Value and corresponding Role name. Value". Assignments consist of Value and corresponding Role name.
Initially this registry is to be populated with the data in Table 1. Initially this registry is to be populated with the data in Table 1.
Future assignments may be made by a standard action Future assignments may be made by a standard action procedure
procedure[RFC5226]. [RFC5226].
This document defines new subcode, "Role Mismatch", assigned value This document defines a new subcode, "Role Mismatch" with an assigned
<TBD2> in the OPEN Message Error subcodes registry [to be removed value <TBD2> in the OPEN Message Error subcodes registry [to be
upon publication: http://www.iana.org/assignments/bgp-parameters/bgp- removed upon publication: http://www.iana.org/assignments/bgp-
parameters.xhtml#bgp-parameters-6] [RFC4271]. parameters/bgp-parameters.xhtml#bgp-parameters-6] [RFC4271].
This document defines a new optional, transitive BGP Path Attributes This document defines a new optional, transitive BGP Path Attributes
option, named "Only To Customer", assigned value <TBD3> [To be option, named "Only to Customer (OTC)" with an assigned value <TBD3>
removed upon publication: http://www.iana.org/assignments/bgp- [To be removed upon publication: http://www.iana.org/assignments/bgp-
parameters/bgp-parameters.xhtml#bgp-parameters-2] [RFC4271]. The parameters/bgp-parameters.xhtml#bgp-parameters-2] [RFC4271]. The
length of this attribute is 0. length of this attribute is four bytes.
10. Security Considerations 10. Security Considerations
This document proposes a mechanism for prevention of route leaks that This document proposes a mechanism for prevention of route leaks that
are the result of BGP policy mis-configuration. are the result of BGP policy mis-configuration.
Deliberate sending of a known conflicting BGP Role could be used to Deliberate sending of a known conflicting BGP Role could be used to
sabotage a BGP connection. This is easily detectable. sabotage a BGP connection. This is easily detectable.
A misconfiguration in OTC setup may affect prefix propagation. But A misconfiguration in OTC setup may affect prefix propagation. But
skipping to change at page 9, line 7 skipping to change at page 9, line 19
[RFC5492] Scudder, J. and R. Chandra, "Capabilities Advertisement [RFC5492] Scudder, J. and R. Chandra, "Capabilities Advertisement
with BGP-4", RFC 5492, DOI 10.17487/RFC5492, February with BGP-4", RFC 5492, DOI 10.17487/RFC5492, February
2009, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5492>. 2009, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5492>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>. May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
12.2. Informative References 12.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-idr-route-leak-detection-mitigation] [Gao] Gao, L. and J. Rexford, "Stable Internet routing without
global coordination", IEEE/ACM Transactions on
Networking, Volume 9, Issue 6, pp 689-692, DOI
10.1109/90.974523, December 2001,
<https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/974523>.
[I-D.ietf-grow-route-leak-detection-mitigation]
Sriram, K. and A. Azimov, "Methods for Detection and Sriram, K. and A. Azimov, "Methods for Detection and
Mitigation of BGP Route Leaks", draft-ietf-idr-route-leak- Mitigation of BGP Route Leaks", draft-ietf-grow-route-
detection-mitigation-10 (work in progress), October 2018. leak-detection-mitigation-01 (work in progress), July
2019.
[RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an [RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", RFC 5226, IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", RFC 5226,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5226, May 2008, DOI 10.17487/RFC5226, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5226>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5226>.
[RFC7908] Sriram, K., Montgomery, D., McPherson, D., Osterweil, E., [RFC7908] Sriram, K., Montgomery, D., McPherson, D., Osterweil, E.,
and B. Dickson, "Problem Definition and Classification of and B. Dickson, "Problem Definition and Classification of
BGP Route Leaks", RFC 7908, DOI 10.17487/RFC7908, June BGP Route Leaks", RFC 7908, DOI 10.17487/RFC7908, June
2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7908>. 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7908>.
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