draft-ietf-dots-requirements-05.txt   draft-ietf-dots-requirements-06.txt 
DOTS A. Mortensen DOTS A. Mortensen
Internet-Draft Arbor Networks Internet-Draft Arbor Networks
Intended status: Informational R. Moskowitz Intended status: Informational R. Moskowitz
Expires: December 9, 2017 HTT Consulting Expires: January 4, 2018 HTT Consulting
T. Reddy T. Reddy
McAfee, Inc. McAfee, Inc.
June 07, 2017 July 03, 2017
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) Open Threat Signaling Requirements Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) Open Threat Signaling Requirements
draft-ietf-dots-requirements-05 draft-ietf-dots-requirements-06
Abstract Abstract
This document defines the requirements for the Distributed Denial of This document defines the requirements for the Distributed Denial of
Service (DDoS) Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) protocols coordinating Service (DDoS) Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) protocols coordinating
attack response against DDoS attacks. attack response against DDoS attacks.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on December 9, 2017. This Internet-Draft will expire on January 4, 2018.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Context and Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1.1. Context and Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2. Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1. General Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.1. General Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2. Signal Channel Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.2. Signal Channel Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.3. Data Channel Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 2.3. Data Channel Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.4. Security requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 2.4. Security requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.5. Data Model Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 2.5. Data Model Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3. Congestion Control Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 3. Congestion Control Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.1. Signal Channel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 3.1. Signal Channel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.2. Data Channel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 3.2. Data Channel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 5. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 6. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
7. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 7. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
7.1. 04 revision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 7.1. 04 revision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
7.2. 03 revision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 7.2. 03 revision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7.3. 02 revision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 7.3. 02 revision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7.4. 01 revision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 7.4. 01 revision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7.5. 00 revision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 7.5. 00 revision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
7.6. Initial revision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 7.6. Initial revision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
1.1. Context and Motivation 1.1. Context and Motivation
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks continue to plague Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks continue to plague
network operators around the globe, from Tier-1 service providers on network operators around the globe, from Tier-1 service providers on
down to enterprises and small businesses. Attack scale and frequency down to enterprises and small businesses. Attack scale and frequency
similarly have continued to increase, in part as a result of software similarly have continued to increase, in part as a result of software
vulnerabilities leading to reflection and amplification attacks. vulnerabilities leading to reflection and amplification attacks.
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status messages SHOULD include the following mitigation metrics: status messages SHOULD include the following mitigation metrics:
* Total number of packets blocked by the mitigation * Total number of packets blocked by the mitigation
* Current number of packets per second blocked * Current number of packets per second blocked
* Total number of bytes blocked * Total number of bytes blocked
* Current number of bytes per second blocked * Current number of bytes per second blocked
DOTS clients SHOULD take these metrics into account when DOTS clients MAY take these metrics into account when determining
determining whether to ask the DOTS server to cease mitigation. whether to ask the DOTS server to cease mitigation.
Once a DOTS client requests mitigation, the client MAY withdraw Once a DOTS client requests mitigation, the client MAY withdraw
that request at any time, regardless of whether mitigation is that request at any time, regardless of whether mitigation is
currently active. The DOTS server MUST immediately acknowledge a currently active. The DOTS server MUST immediately acknowledge a
DOTS client's request to stop mitigation. DOTS client's request to stop mitigation.
To protect against route or DNS flapping caused by a client To protect against route or DNS flapping caused by a client
rapidly toggling mitigation, and to dampen the effect of rapidly toggling mitigation, and to dampen the effect of
oscillating attacks, DOTS servers MAY allow mitigation to continue oscillating attacks, DOTS servers MAY allow mitigation to continue
for a limited period after acknowledging a DOTS client's for a limited period after acknowledging a DOTS client's
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are out of scope for this document, but MUST be included in the are out of scope for this document, but MUST be included in the
mitigation rejection message from the server, per SIG-005. mitigation rejection message from the server, per SIG-005.
SIG-007 Mitigation Scope: DOTS clients MUST indicate desired SIG-007 Mitigation Scope: DOTS clients MUST indicate desired
mitigation scope. The scope type will vary depending on the mitigation scope. The scope type will vary depending on the
resources requiring mitigation. All DOTS agent implementations resources requiring mitigation. All DOTS agent implementations
MUST support the following required scope types: MUST support the following required scope types:
* IPv4 addresses in dotted quad format * IPv4 addresses in dotted quad format
* IPv4 address prefixes in CIDR notation [RFC4632] * IPv4 prefixes in CIDR notation [RFC4632]
* IPv6 addresses [RFC2373] * IPv6 addresses [RFC4291][RFC5952]
* IPv6 address prefixes [RFC2373] * IPv6 prefixes [RFC4291][RFC5952]
* Domain names [RFC1035] * Domain names [RFC1035]
The following mitigation scope types are OPTIONAL: The following mitigation scope types are OPTIONAL:
* Uniform Resource Identifiers [RFC3986] * Uniform Resource Identifiers [RFC3986]
DOTS agents MUST support mitigation scope aliases, allowing DOTS DOTS agents MUST support mitigation scope aliases, allowing DOTS
client and server to refer to collections of protected resources client and server to refer to collections of protected resources
by an opaque identifier created through the data channel, direct by an opaque identifier created through the data channel, direct
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attack details. Such supplemental information is OPTIONAL, and attack details. Such supplemental information is OPTIONAL, and
DOTS servers MAY ignore it when enabling countermeasures on the DOTS servers MAY ignore it when enabling countermeasures on the
mitigator. mitigator.
As an active attack evolves, clients MUST be able to adjust as As an active attack evolves, clients MUST be able to adjust as
necessary the scope of requested mitigation by refining the scope necessary the scope of requested mitigation by refining the scope
of resources requiring mitigation. of resources requiring mitigation.
SIG-008 Mitigation Efficacy: When a mitigation request by a DOTS SIG-008 Mitigation Efficacy: When a mitigation request by a DOTS
client is active, DOTS clients SHOULD transmit a metric of client is active, DOTS clients SHOULD transmit a metric of
perceived mitigation efficacy to the DOTS server, per "Automatic perceived mitigation efficacy to the DOTS server. DOTS servers
or Operator-Assisted CPE or PE Mitigators Request Upstream DDoS
Mitigation Services" in [I-D.ietf-dots-use-cases]. DOTS servers
MAY use the efficacy metric to adjust countermeasures activated on MAY use the efficacy metric to adjust countermeasures activated on
a mitigator on behalf of a DOTS client. a mitigator on behalf of a DOTS client.
SIG-009 Conflict Detection and Notification: Multiple DOTS clients SIG-009 Conflict Detection and Notification: Multiple DOTS clients
controlled by a single administrative entity may send conflicting controlled by a single administrative entity may send conflicting
mitigation requests for pool of protected resources , as a result mitigation requests for pool of protected resources , as a result
of misconfiguration, operator error, or compromised DOTS clients. of misconfiguration, operator error, or compromised DOTS clients.
DOTS servers attempting to honor conflicting requests may flap DOTS servers attempting to honor conflicting requests may flap
network route or DNS information, degrading the networks network route or DNS information, degrading the networks
attempting to participate in attack response with the DOTS attempting to participate in attack response with the DOTS
clients. DOTS servers SHALL detect such conflicting requests, and clients. DOTS servers SHALL detect such conflicting requests, and
SHALL notify the DOTS clients in conflict. The notification SHALL notify the DOTS clients in conflict. The notification
SHOULD indicate the nature and scope of the conflict, for example, SHOULD indicate the nature and scope of the conflict, for example,
the overlapping prefix range in a conflicting mitigation request. the overlapping prefix range in a conflicting mitigation request.
SIG-010: Network Address Translator Traversal: The DOTS protocol SIG-010: Network Address Translator Traversal: DOTS clients may be
MUST operate over networks in which Network Address Translation deployed behind a Network Address Translator (NAT), and need to
(NAT) is deployed. If UDP is used as the transport for the DOTS communicate with DOTS servers through the NAT. DOTS protocols
signal channel, all considerations in "Middlebox Traversal MUST therefore be capable of traversing NATs.
Guidelines" in [RFC5405] apply to DOTS. Regardless of transport,
DOTS protocols MUST follow established best common practices If UDP is used as the transport for the DOTS signal channel, all
(BCPs) for NAT traversal. considerations in "Middlebox Traversal Guidelines" in [RFC5405]
apply to DOTS. Regardless of transport, DOTS protocols MUST
follow established best common practices (BCPs) for NAT traversal.
2.3. Data Channel Requirements 2.3. Data Channel Requirements
The data channel is intended to be used for bulk data exchanges The data channel is intended to be used for bulk data exchanges
between DOTS agents. Unlike the signal channel, which must operate between DOTS agents. Unlike the signal channel, which must operate
nominally even when confronted with signal degradation due to packet nominally even when confronted with signal degradation due to packet
loss, the data channel is not expected to be constructed to deal with loss, the data channel is not expected to be constructed to deal with
attack conditions. As the primary function of the data channel is attack conditions. As the primary function of the data channel is
data exchange, a reliable transport is required in order for DOTS data exchange, a reliable transport is required in order for DOTS
agents to detect data delivery success or failure. agents to detect data delivery success or failure.
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may be revealed to third-party DOTS agents, such considerations may be revealed to third-party DOTS agents, such considerations
are not in scope for this document. are not in scope for this document.
DATA-003 Resource Configuration: To help meet the general and signal DATA-003 Resource Configuration: To help meet the general and signal
channel requirements in this document, DOTS server implementations channel requirements in this document, DOTS server implementations
MUST provide an interface to configure resource identifiers, as MUST provide an interface to configure resource identifiers, as
described in SIG-007. DOTS server implementations MAY expose described in SIG-007. DOTS server implementations MAY expose
additional configurability. Additional configurability is additional configurability. Additional configurability is
implementation-specific. implementation-specific.
DATA-004 Black- and whitelist management: DOTS servers SHOULD DATA-004 Black- and whitelist management: DOTS servers MUST provide
provide methods for DOTS clients to manage black- and white-lists methods for DOTS clients to manage black- and white-lists of
of traffic destined for resources belonging to a client. traffic destined for resources belonging to a client.
For example, a DOTS client should be able to create a black- or For example, a DOTS client should be able to create a black- or
whitelist entry; retrieve a list of current entries from either whitelist entry; retrieve a list of current entries from either
list; update the content of either list; and delete entries as list; update the content of either list; and delete entries as
necessary. necessary.
How the DOTS server determines client ownership of address space How the DOTS server authorizes DOTS client management of black-
is not in scope. and white-list entries is implementation-specific.
2.4. Security requirements 2.4. Security requirements
DOTS must operate within a particularly strict security context, as DOTS must operate within a particularly strict security context, as
an insufficiently protected signal or data channel may be subject to an insufficiently protected signal or data channel may be subject to
abuse, enabling or supplementing the very attacks DOTS purports to abuse, enabling or supplementing the very attacks DOTS purports to
mitigate. mitigate.
SEC-001 Peer Mutual Authentication: DOTS agents MUST authenticate SEC-001 Peer Mutual Authentication: DOTS agents MUST authenticate
each other before a DOTS signal or data channel is considered each other before a DOTS signal or data channel is considered
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above. above.
While the interfaces between downstream DOTS server and upstream While the interfaces between downstream DOTS server and upstream
DOTS client within a DOTS gateway are implementation-specific, DOTS client within a DOTS gateway are implementation-specific,
those interfaces nevertheless MUST provide security equivalent to those interfaces nevertheless MUST provide security equivalent to
that of the signal channels bridged by gateways in the signaling that of the signal channels bridged by gateways in the signaling
path. For example, when a DOTS gateway consisting of a DOTS path. For example, when a DOTS gateway consisting of a DOTS
server and DOTS client is running on the same logical device, they server and DOTS client is running on the same logical device, they
must be within the same process security boundary. must be within the same process security boundary.
SEC-003 Message Replay Protection: In order to prevent a passive SEC-003 Message Replay Protection: To prevent a passive attacker
attacker from capturing and replaying old messages, DOTS protocols from capturing and replaying old messages, and thereby potentially
MUST provide a method for replay detection. disrupting or influencing the network policy of the receiving DOTS
agent's domain, DOTS protocols MUST provide a method for replay
detection and prevention.
Within the signal channel, messages MUST be uniquely identified
such that replayed or duplicated messages may be detected and
discarded. Unique mitigation requests MUST be processed at most
once.
SEC-004 Authorization: DOTS servers MUST authorize all messages from
DOTS clients which pertain to mitigation, configuration,
filtering, or status.
DOTS servers MUST reject mitigation requests with scopes which the
DOTS client is not authorized to manage.
Likewise, DOTS servers MUST refuse to allow creation, modification
or deletion of scope aliases and black-/white-lists when the DOTS
client is unauthorized.
The modes of authorization are implementation-specific.
2.5. Data Model Requirements 2.5. Data Model Requirements
The value of DOTS is in standardizing a mechanism to permit elements, The value of DOTS is in standardizing a mechanism to permit elements,
networks or domains under or under threat of DDoS attack to request networks or domains under or under threat of DDoS attack to request
aid mitigating the effects of any such attack. A well-structured aid mitigating the effects of any such attack. A well-structured
DOTS data model is therefore critical to the development of a DOTS data model is therefore critical to the development of a
successful DOTS protocol. successful DOTS protocol.
DM-001: Structure: The data model structure for the DOTS protocol DM-001: Structure: The data model structure for the DOTS protocol
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[RFC1191] Mogul, J. and S. Deering, "Path MTU discovery", RFC 1191, [RFC1191] Mogul, J. and S. Deering, "Path MTU discovery", RFC 1191,
DOI 10.17487/RFC1191, November 1990, DOI 10.17487/RFC1191, November 1990,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1191>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1191>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC2373] Hinden, R. and S. Deering, "IP Version 6 Addressing
Architecture", RFC 2373, DOI 10.17487/RFC2373, July 1998,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2373>.
[RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform [RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66, Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005, RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.
[RFC4291] Hinden, R. and S. Deering, "IP Version 6 Addressing
Architecture", RFC 4291, DOI 10.17487/RFC4291, February
2006, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4291>.
[RFC4632] Fuller, V. and T. Li, "Classless Inter-domain Routing [RFC4632] Fuller, V. and T. Li, "Classless Inter-domain Routing
(CIDR): The Internet Address Assignment and Aggregation (CIDR): The Internet Address Assignment and Aggregation
Plan", BCP 122, RFC 4632, DOI 10.17487/RFC4632, August Plan", BCP 122, RFC 4632, DOI 10.17487/RFC4632, August
2006, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4632>. 2006, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4632>.
[RFC4821] Mathis, M. and J. Heffner, "Packetization Layer Path MTU [RFC4821] Mathis, M. and J. Heffner, "Packetization Layer Path MTU
Discovery", RFC 4821, DOI 10.17487/RFC4821, March 2007, Discovery", RFC 4821, DOI 10.17487/RFC4821, March 2007,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4821>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4821>.
[RFC5405] Eggert, L. and G. Fairhurst, "Unicast UDP Usage Guidelines [RFC5405] Eggert, L. and G. Fairhurst, "Unicast UDP Usage Guidelines
for Application Designers", RFC 5405, for Application Designers", RFC 5405,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5405, November 2008, DOI 10.17487/RFC5405, November 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5405>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5405>.
[RFC5952] Kawamura, S. and M. Kawashima, "A Recommendation for IPv6
Address Text Representation", RFC 5952,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5952, August 2010,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5952>.
8.2. Informative References 8.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-dots-architecture] [I-D.ietf-dots-architecture]
Mortensen, A., Andreasen, F., Reddy, T., Mortensen, A., Andreasen, F., Reddy, T.,
christopher_gray3@cable.comcast.com, c., Compton, R., and christopher_gray3@cable.comcast.com, c., Compton, R., and
N. Teague, "Distributed-Denial-of-Service Open Threat N. Teague, "Distributed-Denial-of-Service Open Threat
Signaling (DOTS) Architecture", draft-ietf-dots- Signaling (DOTS) Architecture", draft-ietf-dots-
architecture-02 (work in progress), May 2017. architecture-03 (work in progress), June 2017.
[I-D.ietf-dots-use-cases] [I-D.ietf-dots-use-cases]
Dobbins, R., Fouant, S., Migault, D., Moskowitz, R., Dobbins, R., Fouant, S., Migault, D., Moskowitz, R.,
Teague, N., Xia, L., and K. Nishizuka, "Use cases for DDoS Teague, N., Xia, L., and K. Nishizuka, "Use cases for DDoS
Open Threat Signaling (DDoS) Open Threat Signaling", Open Threat Signaling (DDoS) Open Threat Signaling",
draft-ietf-dots-use-cases-05 (work in progress), May 2017. draft-ietf-dots-use-cases-05 (work in progress), May 2017.
[RFC3261] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston, [RFC3261] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston,
A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E. A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E.
Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261, Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261,
 End of changes. 22 change blocks. 
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