draft-ietf-dots-requirements-02.txt   draft-ietf-dots-requirements-03.txt 
DOTS A. Mortensen DOTS A. Mortensen
Internet-Draft Arbor Networks, Inc. Internet-Draft Arbor Networks, Inc.
Intended status: Informational R. Moskowitz Intended status: Informational R. Moskowitz
Expires: January 9, 2017 HTT Consulting Expires: May 3, 2017 HTT Consulting
T. Reddy T. Reddy
Cisco Systems, Inc. Cisco Systems, Inc.
July 08, 2016 October 30, 2016
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) Open Threat Signaling Requirements Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) Open Threat Signaling Requirements
draft-ietf-dots-requirements-02 draft-ietf-dots-requirements-03
Abstract Abstract
This document defines the requirements for the Distributed Denial of This document defines the requirements for the Distributed Denial of
Service (DDoS) Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) protocols coordinating Service (DDoS) Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) protocols coordinating
attack response against DDoS attacks. attack response against DDoS attacks.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on January 9, 2017. This Internet-Draft will expire on May 3, 2017.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Context and Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1.1. Context and Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2. Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1. General Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.1. General Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2. Operational Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2.2. Operational Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.3. Data Channel Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 2.3. Data Channel Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.4. Security requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 2.4. Security requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.5. Data Model Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 2.5. Data Model Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3. Congestion Control Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 3. Congestion Control Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.1. Signal Channel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 3.1. Signal Channel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.2. Data Channel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 3.2. Data Channel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 5. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 6. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
7. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 7. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
7.1. 02 revision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 7.1. 03 revision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
7.2. 01 revision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 7.2. 02 revision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7.3. 00 revision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 7.3. 01 revision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7.4. Initial revision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 7.4. 00 revision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 7.5. Initial revision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
1.1. Context and Motivation 1.1. Context and Motivation
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks continue to plague Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks continue to plague
networks around the globe, from Tier-1 service providers on down to networks around the globe, from Tier-1 service providers on down to
enterprises and small businesses. Attack scale and frequency enterprises and small businesses. Attack scale and frequency
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DDoS: A distributed denial-of-service attack, in which traffic DDoS: A distributed denial-of-service attack, in which traffic
originating from multiple sources are directed at a target on a originating from multiple sources are directed at a target on a
network. DDoS attacks are intended to cause a negative impact on network. DDoS attacks are intended to cause a negative impact on
the availability of servers, services, applications, and/or other the availability of servers, services, applications, and/or other
functionality of an attack target. Denial-of-service functionality of an attack target. Denial-of-service
considerations are discussed in detail in [RFC4732]. considerations are discussed in detail in [RFC4732].
DDoS attack target: A network connected entity with a finite set of DDoS attack target: A network connected entity with a finite set of
resources, such as network bandwidth, memory or CPU, that is the resources, such as network bandwidth, memory or CPU, that is the
focus of a DDoS attack. Potential targets include servers, focus of a DDoS attack. Potential targets include network
services and applications. elements, servers, and services.
DDoS attack telemetry: Collected behavioral characteristics defining DDoS attack telemetry: Collected behavioral characteristics defining
the nature of a DDoS attack. This document makes no assumptions the nature of a DDoS attack.
regarding telemetry collection methodology.
Countermeasure: An action or set of actions taken to recognize and Countermeasure: An action or set of actions taken to recognize and
filter out DDoS attack traffic while passing legitimate traffic to filter out DDoS attack traffic while passing legitimate traffic to
the attack target. the attack target.
Mitigation: A set of countermeasures enforced against traffic Mitigation: A set of countermeasures enforced against traffic
destined for the target or targets of a detected or reported DDoS destined for the target or targets of a detected or reported DDoS
attack, where countermeasure enforcement is managed by an entity attack, where countermeasure enforcement is managed by an entity
in the network path between attack sources and the attack target. in the network path between attack sources and the attack target.
Mitigation methodology is out of scope for this document. Mitigation methodology is out of scope for this document.
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attack response coordination with other DOTS-aware elements. attack response coordination with other DOTS-aware elements.
DOTS server: A DOTS-aware software module handling and responding to DOTS server: A DOTS-aware software module handling and responding to
messages from DOTS clients. The DOTS server SHOULD enable messages from DOTS clients. The DOTS server SHOULD enable
mitigation on behalf of the DOTS client, if requested, by mitigation on behalf of the DOTS client, if requested, by
communicating the DOTS client's request to the mitigator and communicating the DOTS client's request to the mitigator and
returning selected mitigator feedback to the requesting DOTS returning selected mitigator feedback to the requesting DOTS
client. A DOTS server MAY also be a mitigator. client. A DOTS server MAY also be a mitigator.
DOTS agent: Any DOTS-aware software module capable of participating DOTS agent: Any DOTS-aware software module capable of participating
in a DOTS siganling session. in a DOTS signaling session.
DOTS gateway: A logical DOTS agent resulting from the logical DOTS gateway: A logical DOTS agent resulting from the logical
concatenation of a DOTS server and a DOTS client, analogous to a concatenation of a DOTS server and a DOTS client, analogous to a
SIP Back-to-Back User Agent (B2BUA) [RFC3261]. DOTS gateways are SIP Back-to-Back User Agent (B2BUA) [RFC3261]. DOTS gateways are
discussed in detail in [I-D.ietf-dots-architecture]. discussed in detail in [I-D.ietf-dots-architecture].
Signal channel: A bidirectional, mutually authenticated Signal channel: A bidirectional, mutually authenticated
communication channel between DOTS agents characterized by communication channel between DOTS agents characterized by
resilience even in conditions leading to severe packet loss, such resilience even in conditions leading to severe packet loss, such
as a volumetric DDoS attack causing network congestion. as a volumetric DDoS attack causing network congestion.
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GEN-005 Bulk Data Exchange: Infrequent bulk data exchange between GEN-005 Bulk Data Exchange: Infrequent bulk data exchange between
DOTS agents can also significantly augment attack response DOTS agents can also significantly augment attack response
coordination, permitting such tasks as population of black- or coordination, permitting such tasks as population of black- or
white-listed source addresses; address or prefix group aliasing; white-listed source addresses; address or prefix group aliasing;
exchange of incident reports; and other hinting or configuration exchange of incident reports; and other hinting or configuration
supplementing attack response. supplementing attack response.
As the resilience requirements for the DOTS signal channel mandate As the resilience requirements for the DOTS signal channel mandate
small signal message size, a separate, secure data channel small signal message size, a separate, secure data channel
utilizing an established reliable transport protocol MUST be used utilizing a reliable transport protocol MUST be used for bulk data
for bulk data exchange. exchange.
2.2. Operational Requirements 2.2. Operational Requirements
OP-001 Use of Common Transport Protocols: DOTS MUST operate over OP-001 Use of Common Transport Protocols: DOTS MUST operate over
common widely deployed and standardized transport protocols. common widely deployed and standardized transport protocols.
While the User Datagram Protocol (UDP) [RFC0768] SHOULD be used While the User Datagram Protocol (UDP) [RFC0768] SHOULD be used
for the signal channel, the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) for the signal channel, the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)
[RFC0793] MAY be used if necessary due to network policy or [RFC0793] MAY be used if necessary due to network policy or
middlebox capabilities or configurations. The data channel MUST middlebox capabilities or configurations. The data channel MUST
use TCP; see Section 2.3 below. use a reliable transport; see Section 2.3 below.
OP-002 Session Health Monitoring: Peer DOTS agents MUST regularly OP-002 Session Health Monitoring: Peer DOTS agents MUST regularly
send heartbeats to each other after mutual authentication in order send heartbeats to each other after mutual authentication in order
to keep the DOTS session open. A session MUST be considered to keep the DOTS session active. A session MUST be considered
active until a DOTS agent explicitly ends the session, or either active until a DOTS agent explicitly ends the session, or either
DOTS agent fails to receive heartbeats from the other after a DOTS agent fails to receive heartbeats from the other after a
mutually agreed upon timeout period has elapsed. mutually agreed upon timeout period has elapsed.
OP-003 Session Redirection: In order to increase DOTS operational OP-003 Session Redirection: In order to increase DOTS operational
flexibility and scalability, DOTS servers SHOULD be able to flexibility and scalability, DOTS servers SHOULD be able to
redirect DOTS clients to another DOTS server at any time. Due to redirect DOTS clients to another DOTS server at any time. Due to
the decreased probability of DOTS server signal delivery due to the decreased probability of DOTS server signal delivery due to
link congestion, it is RECOMMENDED DOTS servers avoid redirecting link congestion, it is RECOMMENDED DOTS servers avoid redirecting
while mitigation is enabled during an active attack against a while mitigation is enabled during an active attack against a
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DOTS servers attempting to honor conflicting requests may flap DOTS servers attempting to honor conflicting requests may flap
network route or DNS information, degrading the networks network route or DNS information, degrading the networks
attempting to participate in attack response with the DOTS attempting to participate in attack response with the DOTS
clients. DOTS servers SHALL detect such conflicting requests, and clients. DOTS servers SHALL detect such conflicting requests, and
SHALL notify the DOTS clients in conflict. The notification SHALL notify the DOTS clients in conflict. The notification
SHOULD indicate the nature and scope of the conflict, for example, SHOULD indicate the nature and scope of the conflict, for example,
the overlapping prefix range in a conflicting mitigation request. the overlapping prefix range in a conflicting mitigation request.
OP-009: Network Address Translator Traversal: The DOTS protocol MUST OP-009: Network Address Translator Traversal: The DOTS protocol MUST
operate over networks in which Network Address Translation (NAT) operate over networks in which Network Address Translation (NAT)
is deployed. As UDP is the recommended transport for DOTS, all is deployed. As UDP is the recommended transport for the DOTS
considerations in "Middlebox Traversal Guidelines" in [RFC5405] signal channel, all considerations in "Middlebox Traversal
apply to DOTS. Regardless of transport, DOTS protocols MUST Guidelines" in [RFC5405] apply to DOTS. Regardless of transport,
follow established best common practices (BCPs) for NAT traversal. DOTS protocols MUST follow established best common practices
(BCPs) for NAT traversal.
2.3. Data Channel Requirements 2.3. Data Channel Requirements
The data channel is intended to be used for bulk data exchanges The data channel is intended to be used for bulk data exchanges
between DOTS agents. Unlike the signal channel, which must operate between DOTS agents. Unlike the signal channel, which must operate
nominally even when confronted with despite signal degradation due to nominally even when confronted with signal degradation due to packet
packet loss, the data channel is not expected to be constructed to loss, the data channel is not expected to be constructed to deal with
deal with attack conditions. As the primary function of the data attack conditions. As the primary function of the data channel is
channel is data exchange, a reliable transport is required in order data exchange, a reliable transport is required in order for DOTS
for DOTS agents to detect data delivery success or failure. agents to detect data delivery success or failure.
The data channel must be extensible. We anticipate the data channel The data channel must be extensible. We anticipate the data channel
will be used for such purposes as configuration or resource will be used for such purposes as configuration or resource
discovery. For example, a DOTS client may submit to the DOTS server discovery. For example, a DOTS client may submit to the DOTS server
a collection of prefixes it wants to refer to by alias when a collection of prefixes it wants to refer to by alias when
requesting mitigation, to which the server would respond with a requesting mitigation, to which the server would respond with a
success status and the new prefix group alias, or an error status and success status and the new prefix group alias, or an error status and
message in the event the DOTS client's data channel request failed. message in the event the DOTS client's data channel request failed.
The transactional nature of such data exchanges suggests a separate The transactional nature of such data exchanges suggests a separate
set of requirements for the data channel, while the potentially set of requirements for the data channel, while the potentially
sensitive content sent between DOTS agents requires extra precautions sensitive content sent between DOTS agents requires extra precautions
to ensure data privacy and authenticity. to ensure data privacy and authenticity.
DATA-001 Reliable transport: Messages sent over the data channel DATA-001 Reliable transport: Messages sent over the data channel
MUST be delivered reliably, in send order. MUST be delivered reliably, in order sent.
DATA-002 Data privacy and integrity: Transmissions over the data DATA-002 Data privacy and integrity: Transmissions over the data
channel is likely to contain operationally or privacy-sensitive channel are likely to contain operationally or privacy-sensitive
information or instructions from the remote DOTS agent. Theft or information or instructions from the remote DOTS agent. Theft or
modification of data channel transmissions could lead to modification of data channel transmissions could lead to
information leaks or malicious transactions on behalf of the information leaks or malicious transactions on behalf of the
sending agent (see Section 4 below). Consequently data sent over sending agent (see Section 4 below). Consequently data sent over
the data channel MUST be encrypted and authenticated using current the data channel MUST be encrypted and authenticated using current
industry best practices. DOTS servers MUST enable means to industry best practices. DOTS servers MUST enable means to
prevent leaking operationally or privacy-sensitive data. Although prevent leaking operationally or privacy-sensitive data. Although
administrative entities participating in DOTS may detail what data administrative entities participating in DOTS may detail what data
may be revealed to third-party DOTS agents, such considerations may be revealed to third-party DOTS agents, such considerations
are not in scope for this document. are not in scope for this document.
DATA-003 Session configuration: To help meet the general and DATA-003 Resource Configuration: To help meet the general and
operational requirements in this document, DOTS servers MUST operational requirements in this document, DOTS server
provide methods for DOTS client operators to configure DOTS implementations MUST provide an interface to configure resource
session behavior using the data channel. DOTS server identifiers, as described in OP-007. DOTS server implementations
implementations MUST have mechanisms to configure the following: MAY expose additional configurability. Additional configurability
is implementation-specific.
* Acceptable signal lossiness, as described in GEN-002.
* Heartbeat intervals, as described in OP-002.
* Maximum mitigation lifetime, as described in OP-005.
* Resource identifiers, as described in OP-006.
DOTS server implementations MAY expose additional configurability.
Additional configurability is implementation-specific.
DATA-004 Black- and whitelist management: DOTS servers SHOULD DATA-004 Black- and whitelist management: DOTS servers SHOULD
provide methods for DOTS clients to manage black- and white-lists provide methods for DOTS clients to manage black- and white-lists
of traffic destined for resources belonging to a client. of traffic destined for resources belonging to a client.
For example, a DOTS client should be able to create a black- or For example, a DOTS client should be able to create a black- or
whitelist entry; retrieve a list of current entries from either whitelist entry; retrieve a list of current entries from either
list; update the content of either list; and delete entries as list; update the content of either list; and delete entries as
necessary. necessary.
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server. While specific transport- and message-level security server. While specific transport- and message-level security
options are not specified, the protocols MUST follow current options are not specified, the protocols MUST follow current
industry best practices for encryption and message authentication. industry best practices for encryption and message authentication.
In order for DOTS protocols to remain secure despite advancements In order for DOTS protocols to remain secure despite advancements
in cryptanalysis and traffic analysis, DOTS agents MUST be able to in cryptanalysis and traffic analysis, DOTS agents MUST be able to
negotiate the terms and mechanisms of protocol security, subject negotiate the terms and mechanisms of protocol security, subject
to the interoperability and signal message size requirements to the interoperability and signal message size requirements
above. above.
While the interfaces between downstream DOTS server and upstream
DOTS client within a DOTS gateway are implementation-specific,
those interfaces nevertheless MUST provide security equivalent to
that of the signaling sessions bridged by gateways in the
signaling path. For example, when a DOTS gateway consisting of a
DOTS server and DOTS client is running on the same logical device,
they must be within the same process security boundary.
SEC-003 Message Replay Protection: In order to prevent a passive SEC-003 Message Replay Protection: In order to prevent a passive
attacker from capturing and replaying old messages, DOTS protocols attacker from capturing and replaying old messages, DOTS protocols
MUST provide a method for replay detection. MUST provide a method for replay detection.
2.5. Data Model Requirements 2.5. Data Model Requirements
The value of DOTS is in standardizing a mechanism to permit elements, The value of DOTS is in standardizing a mechanism to permit elements,
networks or domains under or under threat of DDoS attack to request networks or domains under or under threat of DDoS attack to request
aid mitigating the effects of any such attack. A well-structured aid mitigating the effects of any such attack. A well-structured
DOTS data model is therefore critical to the development of a DOTS data model is therefore critical to the development of a
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above, the data model MUST be capable of flexible representation above, the data model MUST be capable of flexible representation
of mitigation scope. of mitigation scope.
DM-005: Mitigation Lifetime Representation: The data model MUST DM-005: Mitigation Lifetime Representation: The data model MUST
support representation of a mitigation request's lifetime, support representation of a mitigation request's lifetime,
including mitigations with no specified end time. including mitigations with no specified end time.
DM-006: Mitigation Efficacy Representation: The data model MUST DM-006: Mitigation Efficacy Representation: The data model MUST
support representation of a DOTS client's understanding of the support representation of a DOTS client's understanding of the
efficacy of a mitigation enabled through a mitigation request. efficacy of a mitigation enabled through a mitigation request.
TBD: how do we represent the efficacy?
DM-007: Relationship to Transport: The DOTS data model MUST NOT DM-007: Acceptable Signal Loss Representation: The data model MUST
be able to represent the DOTS agent's preference for acceptable
signal loss when establishing a signaling session, as described in
GEN-002.
DM-008: Heartbeat Interval Representation: The data model MUST be
able to represent the DOTS agent's preferred heartbeat interval,
which the client may include when establishing the signal channel,
as described in OP-002.
DM-009: Relationship to Transport: The DOTS data model MUST NOT
depend on the specifics of any transport to represent fields in depend on the specifics of any transport to represent fields in
the model. the model.
3. Congestion Control Considerations 3. Congestion Control Considerations
3.1. Signal Channel 3.1. Signal Channel
As part of a protocol expected to operate over links affected by DDoS As part of a protocol expected to operate over links affected by DDoS
attack traffic, the DOTS signal channel MUST NOT contribute attack traffic, the DOTS signal channel MUST NOT contribute
significantly to link congestion. To meet the operational significantly to link congestion. To meet the operational
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o Signaling blocking o Signaling blocking
The DOTS protocol MUST be designed for minimal data transfer to The DOTS protocol MUST be designed for minimal data transfer to
address the blocking risk. Impersonation and traffic injection address the blocking risk. Impersonation and traffic injection
mitigation can be managed through current secure communications best mitigation can be managed through current secure communications best
practices. See Section 2.4 above for a detailed discussion. practices. See Section 2.4 above for a detailed discussion.
5. Contributors 5. Contributors
Med Boucadair Flemming Andreasen Med Boucadair
Orange
mohamed.boucadair@orange.com
Flemming Andreasen:
Cisco Systems, Inc.
fandreas@cisco.com
6. Acknowledgments 6. Acknowledgments
Thanks to Roman Danyliw and Matt Richardson for careful reading and Thanks to Roman Danyliw and Matt Richardson for careful reading and
feedback. feedback.
7. Change Log 7. Change Log
7.1. 02 revision 7.1. 03 revision
7.2. 01 revision 2016-10-30
o Extended SEC-003 to require secure interfaces within DOTS
gateways.
o Changed DATA-003 to Resource Configuration, delegating control of
acceptable signal loss, heartbeat intervals, and mitigation
lifetime to DOTS client.
o Added data model requirements reflecting client control over the
above.
7.2. 02 revision
7.3. 01 revision
2016-03-21 2016-03-21
o Reconciled terminology with -00 revision of o Reconciled terminology with -00 revision of
[I-D.ietf-dots-use-cases]. [I-D.ietf-dots-use-cases].
o Terminology clarification based on working group feedback. o Terminology clarification based on working group feedback.
o Moved security-related requirements to separate section. o Moved security-related requirements to separate section.
o Made resilience/robustness primary general requirement to align o Made resilience/robustness primary general requirement to align
with charter. with charter.
o Clarified support for unidirectional communication within the o Clarified support for unidirectional communication within the
bidirection signal channel. bidirectional signal channel.
o Added proposed operational requirement to support session o Added proposed operational requirement to support session
redirection. redirection.
o Added proposed operational requirement to support conflict o Added proposed operational requirement to support conflict
notification. notification.
o Added proposed operational requirement to support mitigation o Added proposed operational requirement to support mitigation
lifetime in mitigation requests. lifetime in mitigation requests.
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efficacy reporting from DOTS clients. efficacy reporting from DOTS clients.
o Added proposed operational requirement to cache lookups of all o Added proposed operational requirement to cache lookups of all
kinds. kinds.
o Added proposed operational requirement regarding NAT traversal. o Added proposed operational requirement regarding NAT traversal.
o Removed redundant mutual authentication requirement from data o Removed redundant mutual authentication requirement from data
channel requirements. channel requirements.
7.3. 00 revision 7.4. 00 revision
2015-10-15 2015-10-15
7.4. Initial revision 7.5. Initial revision
2015-09-24 Andrew Mortensen 2015-09-24 Andrew Mortensen
8. References 8. References
8.1. Normative References 8.1. Normative References
[RFC0768] Postel, J., "User Datagram Protocol", STD 6, RFC 768, [RFC0768] Postel, J., "User Datagram Protocol", STD 6, RFC 768,
DOI 10.17487/RFC0768, August 1980, DOI 10.17487/RFC0768, August 1980,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc768>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc768>.
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